I'm not interested in your questioo...
..
Oh sorry, just a feedback loop from one of your earlier replies.
Yes, I
really think Russia Doesn't like (hated) NATO's expansion and felt it was falling too far on the 'back foot' with the U.S. interventions in Ukrainian politics & the courting/grooming of Ukraine for NATO.
and in general...
...Ukraine, a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard, is a geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases tobe a Eurasian empire. Russia without Ukraine can still strive for imperial status, but it would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians, who would then be resentful of the loss of their recent independence and would be supported by their fellow Islamic states to the south. China would also be likely to oppose any restoration of Russian domination over Central Asia, given its increasing interest in the newly independent states there. However, ifMoscow regains control over Ukraine, with its 52 million people and major resources as well as its access to the Black Sea, Russia automatically again regains the wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia. Ukraine's loss of independence would have immediate consequences for CentralEurope, transforming Poland into the geopolitical pivot on the eastern frontier of a united Europe.Despite its limited size and small population, Azerbaijan, with its vast energy resources, is also geopolitically critical. It is the cork in thebottle containing the riches of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia.The independence of the Central Asian states can be rendered nearly meaningless if Azerbaijan becomes fully-46-subordinated to Moscow's control. Azerbaijan's own and very significant oil resources can also be subjected to Russian control, onceAzerbaijan's independence has been nullified. An independentAzerbaijan, linked to Western markets by pipelines that do not passthrough Russian-controlled territory, also becomes a major avenue of access from the advanced and energy-consuming economies to the energy rich Central Asian republics. Almost as much as in the case ofUkraine, the future of Azerbaijan and Central Asia is also crucial in defining what Russia might or might not become....
...
...
...Most troubling of all was the loss of Ukraine. The appearance of anindependent Ukrainian state not only challenged all Russians to rethinkthe nature of their own political and ethnic identity, but it representeda vital geopolitical setback for the Russian state. The repudiation ofmore than three hundred years of Russian imperial history meant theloss of a potentially rich industrial and agricultural economy and of 52 million people ethnically and religiously sufficiently close to theRussians to make Russia into a truly large and confident imperial state.Ukraine's independence also deprived Russia of its dominant positionon the Black Sea, where Odessa had served as Russia's vital gatewayto trade with the Mediterranean and the world beyond.The loss of Ukraine was geopolitically pivotal, for it drastically limitedRussia's geostrategic options. Even without the Baltic states andPoland, a Russia that retained control over Ukraine could still seek tobe the leader of an assertive Eurasian empire, in which Moscow coulddominate the non-Slavs in the South and Southeast of the formerSoviet Union. But without Ukraine and its 52 million fellow Slavs, anyattempt by Moscow to rebuild the Eurasian empire was likely to leaveRussia entangled alone in protracted conflicts with the nationally and religiously aroused nonSlavs, the war with Chechnya perhaps simply being the first example. Moreover, given Russia's declining birth rate and the explosive birthrate among the Central Asians, any newEurasian entity based purely on Russian power, without Ukraine, would inevitably become less European and more Asiatic with each passingy ear. ....
....
Ukraine's political self-determination stunned Moscow and set an example that the other Soviet republics, though initially more timidly, then followed.Russia's loss of its dominant position on the Baltic Sea was replicated on the Black Sea not only because of Ukraine's independence but also because the newly independent Caucasian states --Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan -- enhanced the opportunities forTurkey to reestablish its once-lost influence in the region. Prior to 1991, the Black Sea was the point of departure for the projection of Russian naval power into the Mediterranean. By the mid-1990s, Russia was left with a small coastal strip on the Black Sea and with an unresolved debate with Ukraine over basing rights in Crimea for the remnants of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, while observing, with evident irritation, jointNATO-Ukrainian naval and shore-landing maneuvers and a growingTurkish role in the Black Sea region. Russia also suspected Turkey ofhaving provided effective aid to the Chechen resistance.Farther to the southeast, the geopolitical upheaval produced a similarly significant change in the status of the Caspian Sea basin and of CentralAsia more generally. Before the Soviet Union's collapse, the! CaspianSea was in effect a Russian lake, with a small southern sector falling within Iran's perimeter. ....
Z Brzezinski "the Grand Chess Board"
and there's more... from others who have a broader view than... "Russian man bad" "Russia want empire".
so, yes, what you insist in viewing as benign expansion I really think they sincerely see as aggressive weakening of their strength.
Again, i do not understand why some folks can not fathom how they rationally can feel threatened.
While some here are cheering for our foreign policy turn back to an aggressive MONROE doctrine.
double standard much?
But hey, I know, I know, Russia bad, U.S. good.
(we've always been so kind to our south American neighbors)
cased closed.
I'll leave it there.