Kathianne
09-05-2024, 11:10 AM
Are they learning the lessons?
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-future-of-warfare-is-electronic-ukraine-invasion-russia-is-the-pentagon-watching-73079a68?st=018i207chcr7ppw&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
The Future of Warfare Is ElectronicAn audacious Ukrainian incursion into Russia shows why. Is the Pentagon paying enough attention?
By Porter Smith and Nathan Mintz
Sept. 4, 2024 12:35 pm ET
A Ukrainian serviceman during a presentation of radio-electronic warfare and radio-electronic intelligence systems in the Lviv region in Ukraine, May 28. Photo: yuriy dyachyshyn/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
The Ukrainian army has launched a stunning offensive into Kursk, Russia, under a shield of advanced electronic weapons. The war in Ukraine is demonstrating that 21st-century conflicts will be won or lost in the arena of electronic warfare.
Think of electronic warfare as casting spells on an invisible battlefield. Combatants strive to preserve their own signals, while disrupting those of the enemy. In Kursk, the Ukrainians took advantage of their technical knowledge to achieve a leap in battlefield tactics. Using a variety of electronic sensing systems, they managed to figure out the key Russian radio frequencies along the invasion route. They jammed these frequencies, creating a series of electronic bubbles that kept enemy drones away from Ukrainian forces, allowing reconnaissance units, tanks and mechanized infantry to breach the Russian border mostly undetected. This is the chaotic way of modern combat: a choreography of lightweight, unmanned systems driven by a spiderweb of electronic signals.
During visits to Ukraine over the past year, we observed the convergence of unmanned systems and electronic warfare, increasingly conducted by front-line troops. An island in the Dnipro River delta south of Mykolaiv is held by a contingent of Ukrainian special forces. These units would normally be supported by heavy artillery, attack aviation, and air-defense missiles, and resupplied by traditional maritime assets. Today, short on conventional resources but buoyed by Ukrainian tech entrepreneurs, they are pioneering the development and use of quadcopters and drone boats for resupply, reconnaissance, evacuation and amphibious assaults.
The Russians have so far been unable to dislodge these innovators but have begun using their own jammers to counter the waves of Ukrainian drone fleets supporting them, effectively creating a classic blockade. With the local electronic environment scrambled, Ukrainian drones have difficulty operating. If the Russians succeed, they could isolate the Ukrainian forces on the island. As these struggles reveal, the ultimate prize in modern warfare is spectrum dominance: ensuring one’s own control of drone networks while detecting and denying the adversary’s.
Connectivity has become as important to war as supply lines. Three decades of innovation have transformed cell phones from a luxury to some 15 billion internet-linked devices today. War zones are jam-packed with electronic brains. Unlike Cold War jets, tanks and ships, each system is primarily controlled by software and relies on the same connectivity found in doorbell security cameras, electric vehicles and consumer mobile apps. The value of a smartphone isn’t necessarily the aluminum rectangle in your hand, but the software it contains and the network to which it’s connected. This is also now true of military devices.
America has a reputation as a global innovator, yet it trails in the dark arts of electronic warfare. Improvised jamming systems and dozens of counter-drone systems have created a spectral environment that the U.S. military isn’t yet prepared to navigate. American drones and munitions frequently can’t overcome the jamming of their guidance systems. Yet we send them to Ukraine, where the Russians often scramble them before they reach their targets.
Our core jamming platforms, such as the EA-18G Growler and antiradiation missiles, are effective but expensive and difficult to build at speed and scale. Using a $1 million missile to destroy a $10,000 jammer and clear the way for a $1,000 drone is absurd. With our current platforms, it will be the norm.
The Ukrainians outside Mykolaiv solved their electronic-warfare woes, however temporarily, without seven-figure munitions. Their marines dangled direction-finding antennas inside PVC piping from a first-person view drone for rough triangulations of Russian jammers using tested, decades-old signals techniques, before using artillery to strike the locations. When we asked why a marine unit, which doesn’t typically specialize in electronic warfare, was running improvised hunter-killer missions on jamming sites, the Ukrainians reacted with surprise. Their electronic intelligence expert explained, “You can’t do anything in this war without first figuring out the jamming.”
A military that can’t build a dynamic electronic shield around its own forces will likewise be unable to maneuver in the coming drone wars. Modern electronic-warfare systems mounted on low-cost drones are now as necessary as munitions. New companies are in the early stages of building the right weapons but need the Pentagon to recognize the same future—and spend accordingly.
We aren’t the only ones watching Ukraine. China moves at the speed of war, while the U.S. moves at the speed of bureaucracy. If we retool our approach to electronic warfare, America will tip the scales in favor of deterrence and, if necessary, victory. If not, we will be subject to the harsh lessons inevitably faced by those who fight the last war.
Mr. Smith is a former U.S. Army attack aviator and officer of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Mr. Mintz, an aerospace engineer, was founding CEO of the defense startups Epirus, Spartan Radar and now CX2.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-future-of-warfare-is-electronic-ukraine-invasion-russia-is-the-pentagon-watching-73079a68?st=018i207chcr7ppw&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
The Future of Warfare Is ElectronicAn audacious Ukrainian incursion into Russia shows why. Is the Pentagon paying enough attention?
By Porter Smith and Nathan Mintz
Sept. 4, 2024 12:35 pm ET
A Ukrainian serviceman during a presentation of radio-electronic warfare and radio-electronic intelligence systems in the Lviv region in Ukraine, May 28. Photo: yuriy dyachyshyn/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
The Ukrainian army has launched a stunning offensive into Kursk, Russia, under a shield of advanced electronic weapons. The war in Ukraine is demonstrating that 21st-century conflicts will be won or lost in the arena of electronic warfare.
Think of electronic warfare as casting spells on an invisible battlefield. Combatants strive to preserve their own signals, while disrupting those of the enemy. In Kursk, the Ukrainians took advantage of their technical knowledge to achieve a leap in battlefield tactics. Using a variety of electronic sensing systems, they managed to figure out the key Russian radio frequencies along the invasion route. They jammed these frequencies, creating a series of electronic bubbles that kept enemy drones away from Ukrainian forces, allowing reconnaissance units, tanks and mechanized infantry to breach the Russian border mostly undetected. This is the chaotic way of modern combat: a choreography of lightweight, unmanned systems driven by a spiderweb of electronic signals.
During visits to Ukraine over the past year, we observed the convergence of unmanned systems and electronic warfare, increasingly conducted by front-line troops. An island in the Dnipro River delta south of Mykolaiv is held by a contingent of Ukrainian special forces. These units would normally be supported by heavy artillery, attack aviation, and air-defense missiles, and resupplied by traditional maritime assets. Today, short on conventional resources but buoyed by Ukrainian tech entrepreneurs, they are pioneering the development and use of quadcopters and drone boats for resupply, reconnaissance, evacuation and amphibious assaults.
The Russians have so far been unable to dislodge these innovators but have begun using their own jammers to counter the waves of Ukrainian drone fleets supporting them, effectively creating a classic blockade. With the local electronic environment scrambled, Ukrainian drones have difficulty operating. If the Russians succeed, they could isolate the Ukrainian forces on the island. As these struggles reveal, the ultimate prize in modern warfare is spectrum dominance: ensuring one’s own control of drone networks while detecting and denying the adversary’s.
Connectivity has become as important to war as supply lines. Three decades of innovation have transformed cell phones from a luxury to some 15 billion internet-linked devices today. War zones are jam-packed with electronic brains. Unlike Cold War jets, tanks and ships, each system is primarily controlled by software and relies on the same connectivity found in doorbell security cameras, electric vehicles and consumer mobile apps. The value of a smartphone isn’t necessarily the aluminum rectangle in your hand, but the software it contains and the network to which it’s connected. This is also now true of military devices.
America has a reputation as a global innovator, yet it trails in the dark arts of electronic warfare. Improvised jamming systems and dozens of counter-drone systems have created a spectral environment that the U.S. military isn’t yet prepared to navigate. American drones and munitions frequently can’t overcome the jamming of their guidance systems. Yet we send them to Ukraine, where the Russians often scramble them before they reach their targets.
Our core jamming platforms, such as the EA-18G Growler and antiradiation missiles, are effective but expensive and difficult to build at speed and scale. Using a $1 million missile to destroy a $10,000 jammer and clear the way for a $1,000 drone is absurd. With our current platforms, it will be the norm.
The Ukrainians outside Mykolaiv solved their electronic-warfare woes, however temporarily, without seven-figure munitions. Their marines dangled direction-finding antennas inside PVC piping from a first-person view drone for rough triangulations of Russian jammers using tested, decades-old signals techniques, before using artillery to strike the locations. When we asked why a marine unit, which doesn’t typically specialize in electronic warfare, was running improvised hunter-killer missions on jamming sites, the Ukrainians reacted with surprise. Their electronic intelligence expert explained, “You can’t do anything in this war without first figuring out the jamming.”
A military that can’t build a dynamic electronic shield around its own forces will likewise be unable to maneuver in the coming drone wars. Modern electronic-warfare systems mounted on low-cost drones are now as necessary as munitions. New companies are in the early stages of building the right weapons but need the Pentagon to recognize the same future—and spend accordingly.
We aren’t the only ones watching Ukraine. China moves at the speed of war, while the U.S. moves at the speed of bureaucracy. If we retool our approach to electronic warfare, America will tip the scales in favor of deterrence and, if necessary, victory. If not, we will be subject to the harsh lessons inevitably faced by those who fight the last war.
Mr. Smith is a former U.S. Army attack aviator and officer of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Mr. Mintz, an aerospace engineer, was founding CEO of the defense startups Epirus, Spartan Radar and now CX2.