Ukraine Invades Russia

[Kathianne]

Not a joke. Has anyone been following this? I've only seen bits and pieces, this is actually the most I've seen:

Video at site

https://instapundit.com/666149/#disqus_thread


August 9, 2024

EVERYTHING IS GOING SWIMMINGLY (MOSCOW EDITION): Ukraine ambushes Russian convoy in Kursk as Kremlin declares emergency. (https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/09/ukraine-ambushes-russian-convoy-in-kursk-as-kremlin-declares-federal-emergency)


A video circulated by Russian military bloggers showed a destroyed convoy, with bodies just visible inside some trucks, on the E38 east-west highway at Oktyabrskoe, a location far deeper inside Russia than any previously confirmed fighting since Ukraine’s forces crossed the border on Tuesday.

Commentators said the attack, reminiscent of Ukrainian attacks on Russian troops besieging Kyiv in the first weeks of the war, demonstrated an effective hit-and-run strategy, but the incursion appeared likely to draw an escalating response from the Kremlin, and its overall outcome remains profoundly uncertain.

Russia’s defence ministry said at lunchtime that it was transferring military reserves to the Kursk region, according to the Interfax news agency, including Grad rockets, artillery and tanks. A video released by Zvezda, official Russian military media, showed a convoy of lorries carrying armoured vehicles down a highway.


Ukraine isn’t about to march on Moscow or anything like that. But Kyiv was able to assemble several companies’ worth of mechanized soldiers without anyone noticing for what has turned into an extended and embarrassing cross-border raid.

Assuming the UA can get back out largely unscathed, that ought to have the Kremlin wondering where and when the next attack might come.

At the very least, Moscow’s redeployments have taken some of the pressure off the UA in the East, where Russian forces had been gaining.
UPDATE:

That’s worse than embarrassing.


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Posted at 2:50 pm by Stephen Green (https://instapundit.com/author/stephengreen/)

[Kathianne]

Gunny or anyone with some knowledge of incursions. Help!

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1821948147234418863.html

Way too long for c & p and I can't tell what's important or not.

[Kathianne]

While I'm not hearing much on news, went looking:

https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/09/kursk-russia-ukraine-offensive-invasion-war-negotiations/


Ukraine’s Invasion of Russia Could Bring a Quicker End to the WarOne aim of the surprise breakthrough may be for Kyiv to gain leverage in negotiations.
By Andreas Umland, an analyst at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
Russian tank in Kursk
Russian tank in Kursk
A Russian tank is seen on a highway in the Kursk region of Russia on Aug. 8. Anatoliy Zhdanov/Kommersant/Sipa via AP Images
My FP: Follow topics and authors to get straight to what you like. Exclusively for FP subscribers. Subscribe Now | Log In


August 9, 2024, 11:21 AM
View Comments ()
In the space of four days, the Russia-Ukraine war has dramatically shifted. The incursion of Ukrainian forces into Russia’s Kursk region has quickly turned into the largest territorial gain by either side since the successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson in the fall of 2022. As of this writing, it is still unclear whether thinned-out and poorly prepared Russian forces have been able to halt the Ukrainian advance, with reports of burning columns of Russian reinforcements reminiscent of the early days of the war.


Russia’s War in Ukraine
Understanding the conflict two years on.


More on this topic


The operation demonstrates Ukraine’s ability to achieve surprise and exploit sudden breakthroughs, something at which Russia has consistently failed since the start of its invasion. It is also the first time Russia has been invaded by foreign troops since World War II, showing Russians in no uncertain terms that the bloody war they unleashed against their neighbor has come home. Ukraine’s Western supporters seem to be on board, with the White House and European Union headquarters issuing statements that it was up to Ukraine to decide on the operation.


Previously, there had been much debate in Washington, Berlin, and among a wildly speculating media about the Kremlin’s supposed red lines that would set off World War III and nuclear Armageddon, with one of the lines being taking the war to Russia with Western weapons. The latter has now occurred. The belief in uncontrolled escalation led the Biden administration and some of its partners to severely restrict both the types of weapons delivered to Ukraine and their permitted range; Ukraine has not been allowed to use Western missiles to hit military installations on the Russian side of the border, for example. Part of the effect and purpose of the Kursk operation could be to demonstrate, once again, the fallacy of the red-line argument.


As the offensive unfolds and Kyiv stays mostly mum on events, it’s still too early to say what strategic goals Ukraine is hoping to achieve. One speculation that has gained a lot of traction is that it could lead to a quicker end to the war. The operation makes it clear to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Ukraine retains significant potential to inflict pain on Russia. And if Ukrainian forces can hold on and maintain control of Russian territory—for which they appear to be digging in as they bring in more equipment and build new defensive lines—it could strengthen Ukraine’s leverage in any potential negotiations to end the war. Already, Ukraine’s lightning foray into Russia undermines the widespread idea that Putin holds all the cards to dictate the terms of a cease-fire.


Kyiv seems to be signaling that leverage in negotiations is one of the goals of the offensive. An unnamed advisor to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told the Washington Post: “This will give them the leverage they need for negotiations with Russia—this is what it’s all about.” This dovetails with recent hints by Zelensky that Kyiv was ready to negotiate. In an interview with BBC News in July, he said, “We don’t have to recapture all the territories” by military means. “I think that can also be achieved with the help of diplomacy.” Occupied Russia could be traded for occupied Ukraine: As former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt suggested on X, “Would an idea be for both states to retreat to within their respective recognized border?”




If Kyiv seems to be preparing the ground for potential negotiations—by seeking to strengthen its hand and publicly declaring its willingness—it is also a response to several factors.


One is growing war weariness among the Ukrainian population. Although the majority of Ukrainians favor fighting on until all the territories Russia has occupied since 2014 are liberated, the number saying that Ukraine could trade some of that territory for peace has been rising.


Second, there has been growing criticism, particularly in Western Europe and the global south, of the way Ukraine has repeatedly ruled out talks with Moscow. Major substantive issues aside, with the Kremlin apparently back-channeling openness to talks, Kyiv risked being seen as intransigent in preventing an early end to the war.


Finally, Ukraine’s strategic position is risky, even if it holds back Russia and maintains the flow of Western weapons. A victory by Donald Trump in the November U.S. presidential election and a sudden stop of U.S. aid cannot be ruled out, and even a Harris administration may have trouble cobbling together future support packages if the Republicans keep their majority in the U.S. House of Representatives. Zelensky may have decided to gamble to change and accelerate the dynamics of the war, including greater leverage if negotiations end up taking place sooner than anticipated.


Without much leverage, Kyiv has had to appeal to moral, normative, and legal arguments when communicating with its foreign partners about any peace short of full liberation. In the past, this has led to highly skewed negotiations. In the talks that produced the Minsk I and II accords in 2014 and 2015, Ukraine had such a weak hand that it had to agree to impossible terms: It could only get the Russian-controlled Donbas back if it allowed Moscow’s proxies to become part of the Ukrainian polity through local elections manipulated by the Kremlin, which would have given Moscow a permanent veto over Kyiv’s politics. Previously occupied and annexed Crimea was not even included in the discussion.


In March 2022, direct talks between Ukraine and Russia on the Belarusian border were not a negotiation but Russia’s delivery of surrender terms to Ukraine. In April 2022, negotiations brokered by Turkey in Istanbul also went nowhere: Russia’s price for ending its invasion was a considerable limitation of Ukrainian sovereignty and ability to defend itself. Since then, Russia’s proposal has been for Ukraine to permanently cede, in addition to Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts—including substantial parts that Russia has never occupied.



https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cr7rn98l8kjo


Russia struggles to repel Ukraine's deep Kursk incursion2 hours ago




Jaroslav Lukiv
BBC News
James Waterhouse
BBC Ukraine correspondent


Reporting from Kyiv




Ukrainian troops remained in Russia’s western Kursk region on Friday night, as its surprise cross-border offensive into Russia came to the end of a fourth day.
The Russian defence ministry said it was “continuing to repel” Ukraine’s military, which it claimed had lost more than 280 personnel in the past 24 hours - a figure that has not been independently verified.


Reports suggest that Ukrainian troops are operating more than 10km (six miles) inside Russia - the deepest cross-border advance by Kyiv since Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.


Ukraine has not openly admitted the incursion, but President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Thursday that Moscow must "feel" the consequences for its invasion.


Fighting in Kursk has edged gradually closer to a nuclear power plant, prompting the UN nuclear agency to release a statement urging the two sides to “exercise maximum restraint”.


International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi appealed to all sides to take measures “to avoid a nuclear accident with the potential for serious radiological consequences”.


Steve Rosenberg: Ukraine's incursion shows Russia's war is not going to plan


State of emergency declared as Ukraine launches raid into Russia


Russia must feel war consequences, says Zelensky amid Ukrainian attack


Some residents of the Kursk region were evacuated by authorities, with a group pulling into Moscow’s central train station on Friday. One unnamed resident told AFP news agency: "It's terrible. They are bombing.”


Overnight, Ukraine's military said it had struck a military airfield deep inside Russia, destroying a warehouse containing hundreds of glide bombs.


The targeting of the Lipetsk air base, more than 350km (217 miles) from Ukraine's border, is the kind of operation Kyiv has been wanting to do for some time.


The weaponry it managed to destroy in the attack is the very kind Russia has used to terrorise Ukrainian towns, cities and military positions for most of its invasion.


The military's statement also said the airfield was known for housing Russia's Su-34, Su-35 and MiG-31 war planes.


Russian authorities nearby said a state of emergency was in place in the area, confirming what they described as “detonations” at an "energy infrastructure facility". Residents of four nearby villages were being evacuated.


Hours after Ukraine’s strikes, Russia responded by striking a shopping centre in the Ukrainian town of Kostyantynivka, close to the frontline in the eastern Donetsk region, killing at least 14 people and injuring 43, Ukrainian officials say.


Residential buildings, shops and more than a dozen cars were also damaged in the attack.


Ukraine and Russia map


Shortly after Ukraine’s offensive was launched on Tuesday, the Russian defence ministry said its forces were managing to suppress "raid attempts by enemy units".


But a video checked by BBC Verify shows a different picture, with a 15-vehicle Russian convoy damaged, burned and abandoned on a road through the town of Oktyabr'skoe, roughly 38km (24 miles) from the border on the Russian side.


The early morning footage also shows Russian soldiers, some injured, possibly dead among the vehicles.


A "federal state of emergency" has been declared in the Kursk region - a move that underlines how grave the current situation is.


Russia said that up to 1,000 Ukrainian troops, supported by tanks and armoured vehicles, entered the Kursk region as the offensive began.


Despite the deployment of reserve troops and orders to evacuate, Russia has been unable to slow the momentum of this Ukrainian advance.




0:55
Footage posted online shows destroyed Russian convoy


This is more than the probing attacks we have seen in the past.


It is a committed assault which has shocked Russia’s military and the Kremlin. For the last 18 months, it has been Moscow dictating the dynamics of this war.


Now it is having to contain this attack, as well as domestic criticism for not preventing it in the first place.


Despite long-time Western worries of an escalation, the consensus among Ukraine’s allies is that this operation falls within its right to defend itself.


While he is yet to directly reference the assault, President Zelensky said in a video address late on Thursday: “Russia has brought the war to our land and should feel what it has done.”


But with his Ukrainian forces still outnumbered by the Russians on the battlefield, the line between masterstroke and miscalculation is a fine one.


The Russian rouble was down 2.5% against the dollar on Friday, with traders telling AFP news agency that Ukraine’s Kursk offensive was one of the reasons behind the fall.

[Kathianne]

One more:

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kursk-incursion-3eba46949e065fac9d846987a106e17a


World NewsRussia declares an emergency in Kursk, under attack by Ukraine. 14 die in a Russian strike on a mall
Russian plane-launched missile slammed into a Ukrainian shopping mall in the middle of the day, killing at least 12 people and wounding 44 others, authorities said.





By SAMYA KULLAB and BARRY HATTON
Updated 12:42 PM MST, August 9, 2024



KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Russia declared a “federal-level” emergency in the Kursk region following a large-scale incursion from Ukraine and sent reinforcements there on Friday, four days after hundreds of Ukrainian troops poured across the border in what appeared to be Kyiv’s biggest attack on Russian soil since the war began.


Meanwhile, a Russian plane-launched missile slammed into a Ukrainian shopping mall in the middle of the day, killing at least 14 people and wounding 44 others, authorities said.


The mall in Kostiantynivka, in the eastern Donetsk region, is located in the town’s residential area. Thick black smoke rose above it after the strike.


“This is another targeted attack on a crowded place, another act of terror by the Russians,” Donetsk regional head Vadym Filashkin said in a Telegram post.


It was the second major strike on the town in almost a year. Last September, a Russian missile hit an outdoor market there, killing 17.


July saw the heaviest civilian casualties in Ukraine since October 2022, the U.N. Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine said Friday. Conflict-related violence killed at least 219 civilians and injured 1,018 in July, the mission said.



Russia’s Defense Ministry said reinforcements were on their way to Kursk to counter Ukraine’s raid, with Russia deploying multiple rocket launchers, towed artillery guns, tanks transported on trailers and heavy tracked vehicles.


The ministry reported fighting in the western outskirts of Sudzha, about 10 kilometers (6 miles) from the border. The town has an important pipeline transit hub for Russian natural gas exports to Europe.


“The operational situation in the Kursk region remains difficult,” Kursk acting governor Alexei Smirnov said on Telegram.


Social services and civic associations are providing assistance to people forced to flee their homes by the fighting, he said. The last Russian figure for those evacuated from Kursk was 3,000.


There has ben little reliable information on the daring Ukrainian operation and its strategic aims are unclear. Ukrainian officials have refused to comment on the incursion, which is taking place about 500 kilometers (320 miles) southwest of Moscow.


But a top adviser to Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Thursday that border region attacks will cause Russia to “start to realize that the war is slowly creeping inside of Russian territory.” Myhailo Podolyak also suggested that the operation would improve Kyiv’s hand in the event of negotiations with Moscow.


Asked about Ukraine’s incursion, White House national security spokesman John Kirby said Friday the United States was “in touch with our Ukrainian counterparts” but that he would not comment until “those conversations are complete.”


“There’s been no changes in our policy approaches,” Kirby said when asked if there had been a change in U.S. policy on use of weapons. “They’re using it in an area where we had said before that they could use U.S. weapons for cross-border strikes. The end goal here is to help Ukraine defend itself.”


Mathieu Boulegue, a defense analyst at the Chatham House think tank in London, said the Ukrainians appear to have a clear goal, even if they’re not saying what it is.


“Such a coordinated ground force movement responds to a clear military objective,” Boulegue told The Associated Press over the phone. Also, the raid has spooked the Russian public and delivered slap in the face to Russian President Vladimir Putin, offering Ukraine “a great PR coup,” he said.


The attack “is a massive symbol, a massive display of force (showing) that the war is not frozen,” he said.


Separately, the Ukrainian army is struggling to hold at bay an intense Russian push at places on the front line in eastern Ukraine, especially in the Donetsk region. Putin has made clear he wants to capture the parts of Donetsk that the Kremlin’s forces do not already occupy.


Russia declares federal level emergencies in situations when there are more than 500 victims or damage exceeds 500 million rubles (about $6 million).


The Kursk fighting has earned considerable attention in Russian media, at the top of news websites and state television news broadcasts.


State TV channel Rossiya-1 devoted its first 10 minutes of its 11 a.m. newscast Friday to the situation, running Defense Ministry’s video showing the destruction of Ukrainian military vehicles and a howitzer.


Much of the coverage was about the humanitarian situation — children being taken to shelters aboard buses, people in other regions gathering food and diapers and other supplies to be sent to Kursk.


The Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank, says Ukrainian forces have pressed on with their “rapid advances” deeper into the Kursk region, reportedly going up to 35 kilometers (20 miles) beyond the border.


“The lack of a coherent Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk … and the reported rate of Ukrainian advance indicates that Ukrainian forces were able to achieve operational surprise,” the think tank said late Thursday.


A Russian Defense Ministry statement Friday said Russia’s military “continues to repel the attempted invasion” and is responding with airstrikes, artillery and troops on the ground. It claimed the Ukrainian armed forces have lost 945 soldiers and 102 armored vehicles, including 12 tanks, in the assault. The claim that could not be independently verified.


Ukraine has also kept up its strategy of hitting rear areas with long-range drones, targeting Russian military sites, oil refineries and other infrastructure.


Ukrainian drones attacked Russia’s Lipetsk region, about 300 kilometers (180 miles) from the Ukraine border, on Thursday night, authorities said.


Drones operated by Ukraine’s Security Service hit a military airfield there, a security official told the AP on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly.


The airfield was a base for fighter jets and helicopters and more than 700 powerful glide bombs in storage,” the official said.


Ukraine’s Army General Staff also confirmed the strike on Lipetsk-2 airfield Friday morning, saying it was used as a base for multiple Su-34, Su-35 and MiG-31 jets.


The Russian Defense Ministry said that 75 Ukrainian drones were shot down during the night, 19 of them over Lipetsk.

[Gunny]

Not a joke. Has anyone been following this? I've only seen bits and pieces, this is actually the most I've seen:

Video at site

https://instapundit.com/666149/#disqus_thread

What I saw is Ukraine has taken about 130 sq miles in the Kursk region. Ukraine had previously been cross-border raiding and whatnot prior to. Probably to get Russia to let its guard down. They did, and Ukraine walked right in the door.

It's a gamble for Ukraine. They took troops otherwise shoring up their lines. Motive is guesswork without Ukraine stating why. Was suggested it was land grab to use as a future bargaining tool. I don't see that. What I do see is it pulling Russian troops off the Donetsk line to shore up Kursk.

A question I did NOT see is: Does Ukraine invading Russian land bring Belarus into the fray? Belarus and Russia have a mutual defense treaty. That idiot Hitler wannabe in Belarus is probably crapping his pants at the thought:rolleyes:

[Gunny]

The other thing I saw is that when Sweden came on board, they went in both feet. Sweden has been historically distrusting of Russia. They've upped their military spending by about 5%. They've already sent over a billion in aid with another billion and a half earmarked. That isn't counting the artillery rounds and combat vehicles on the way already. Sweden also offered up some of its Gripen fighters which Ukraine balked on. They're already trying to get revved up on the F-16 and do not have the capacity to field both fighter jets.

[Kathianne]

The other thing I saw is that when Sweden came on board, they went in both feet. Sweden has been historically distrusting of Russia. They've upped their military spending by about 5%. They've already sent over a billion in aid with another billion and a half earmarked. That isn't counting the artillery rounds and combat vehicles on the way already. Sweden also offered up some of its Gripen fighters which Ukraine balked on. They're already trying to get revved up on the F-16 and do not have the capacity to field both fighter jets.


https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukrainian-forces-push-deeper-into-russian-territory-following-surprise-incursion-e842b7bb?st=k56p77m30unvpbb&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink


Ukrainian Forces Push Deeper Into Russian Territory Following Surprise IncursionU.S. officials say the aim of Ukraine’s assault remains unclear
By
Isabel Coles
Follow
Aug. 9, 2024 5:58 pm ET










Gift unlocked article


Listen


(4 min)






A Russian military convoy rolled toward where Ukrainian forces made a strong cross-border move this week. Photo: Russian Defence Ministry/Zuma Press
KYIV—Moscow battled to regain control of its border region as Ukrainian forces pushed deeper into Russian territory four days after a surprise incursion.


As Russia struggled to push Ukrainian soldiers back, Kyiv’s forces struck at least one Russian military column and claimed to be in control of a town in the lightly defended Kursk region.


Ukraine carried out cross-border raids earlier in the conflict, but the scale of the latest assault is significantly larger. Ukraine now faces a decision on whether to commit additional forces to a promising but risky incursion given the pressure Russian troops are exerting on Kyiv’s threadbare front lines in the east.


Ukrainian officials haven’t commented directly on the incursion, but President Volodymyr Zelensky said Friday that he had received “productive” reports from his military chief, Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrskiy.


“Russia brought the war to our land, and it should feel what it has done,” he said.




Children were evacuated by Russian authorities in the region where Ukrainian forces are making a strong push. Photo: government of kursk region hando/Shutterstock
Russia’s defense ministry said its forces “continue to repel an attempted invasion by the Armed Forces of Ukraine into the territory of the Russian Federation.” Earlier this week, the country’s top military commander, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, reported to President Vladimir Putin that the advance had been halted.


Video posted on social media and verified by Storyful, owned by The Wall Street Journal’s parent company News Corp, showed a convoy of more than a dozen burnt-out Russian military vehicles—some containing corpses—on a highway in the Kursk region. In another video, Ukrainian soldiers claimed to be in control of the town of Sudzha, about 6 miles inside Russia.


The Russian defense ministry said its forces had destroyed five Stryker armored fighting vehicles operated by Kyiv’s forces. The mayor of Sudzha denied the town was under Ukrainian control in comments to Russian state media and said an evacuation of local residents was under way.


In videos circulated on social media, displaced civilians pleaded with Putin to come to their aid. “Putin, please come here and help protect us,” screamed one woman.


U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby indicated Friday the U.S. still doesn’t know what Ukraine intends to accomplish with its incursion into Russia. “We’re in touch with our Ukrainian counterparts, and we are working to gain a better understanding of what they’re doing, what their goals are, what their strategy is,” he said. The U.S. previously said it didn’t receive advance notice of the operation, which is normal for a tactical move.


The cross-border attack comes at a time when Ukrainian forces are under intense pressure along the front line in the east of the country. Russia is advancing toward the critical Ukrainian logistical hub of Pokrovsk and mounting relentless attacks on the nearby city of Chasiv Yar, located on strategically important heights in the eastern Donbas region.


By pushing into Russian territory, Ukraine may be hoping to draw resources away from other parts of the front.


The number of troops involved in the raid is small compared with the hundreds of thousands deployed on each side within Ukraine.


As fighting raged in Kursk, Rafael Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, voiced concern about reports of fighting in the region where a nuclear power station is located. Grossi said he was monitoring the situation and was in contact with the relevant authorities of both countries.


“At this juncture, I would like to appeal to all sides to exercise maximum restraint in order to avoid a nuclear accident with the potential for serious radiological consequences,” he said.


Alex Ward, Matthew Luxmoore and Laurence Norman also contributed to this article.

[Black Diamond]

Some Ukrainians say kursk, not stalingrad, was turning point of Hitlers war in the east. Major battle for sure. Interesting seeing it come up again

[revelarts]

Should the U.S. send troops to invade Russia with Ukraine?
Is Ukraine an official "Ally" of the U.S.?
Should there be any limit to our support of Ukraines Attacks on Russia?

I'll wait for the crickets or dodgy, instead of simple Yes or No, replies.

[fj1200]

No. No. Yes.

[Gunny]

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukrainian-forces-push-deeper-into-russian-territory-following-surprise-incursion-e842b7bb?st=k56p77m30unvpbb&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

Russia suddenly has noncombatant victims and it's noteworthy. All the dead and/or displaced Ukrainians don't count. After all, they're just heretics and Nazis:rolleyes:

[Gunny]

Should the U.S. send troops to invade Russia with Ukraine?
Is Ukraine an official "Ally" of the U.S.?
Should there be any limit to our support of Ukraines Attacks on Russia?

I'll wait for the crickets or dodgy, instead of simple Yes or No, replies.

Non sequitur questions demanding restricted responses:rolleyes:

[revelarts]

Russia suddenly has noncombatant victims and it's noteworthy. All the dead and/or displaced Ukrainians don't count. After all, they're just heretics and Nazis:rolleyes:
Everyone counts.

And If everyone counts, it seems a cease fire might be in order.
Rather than continued escalation.
Right?

or should more Ukrainians die... for, as L Gaham said "the resources"?
or maybe more Ukrainians should die to WIN. Hows that working?

But Gunny, I agree, i hope you are saying that Ukrainians lives are of the HIGHEST of concern so the sooner the conflict ends the better.

[Gunny]

Everyone counts.

And If everyone counts, it seems a cease fire might be in order.
Rather than continued escalation.
Right?

or should more Ukrainians die... for, as L Gaham said "the resources"?
or maybe more Ukrainians should die to WIN. Hows that working?

But Gunny, I agree, i hope you are saying that Ukrainians lives are of the HIGHEST of concern so the sooner the conflict ends the better.Tell Putin. He's the aggressor. A word from him and withdrawal of Russian forces from all occupied Ukrainian territory would end this whole thing. Ukraine did everything it could to avoid this war, including patronizing Putin, even after the writing was on the wall.

There clearly is a good guy and a bad guy here that no moral equivocating overcomes.

[Black Diamond]

Tell Putin. He's the aggressor. A word from him and withdrawal of Russian forces from all occupied Ukrainian territory would end this whole thing. Ukraine did everything it could to avoid this war, including patronizing Putin, even after the writing was on the wall.

There clearly is a good guy and a bad guy here that no moral equivocating overcomes.

Did Ukraine promise to never join NATO?

[Kathianne]

Did Ukraine promise to never join NATO?


https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm

[Gunny]

Did Ukraine promise to never join NATO?Is Ukraine a member of NATO? The first time I saw NATO membership mentioned by Ukraine was AFTER Russia's invasion.

That whole line by Putin is BS. Putin's issue with Ukraine began when the people of Ukraine voted out his puppets and voted in Ukrainians. Ukraine turning toward Western markets pissed him off.

[Kathianne]

Is Ukraine a member of NATO? The first time I saw NATO membership mentioned by Ukraine was AFTER Russia's invasion.

That whole line by Putin is BS. Putin's issue with Ukraine began when the people of Ukraine voted out his puppets and voted in Ukrainians. Ukraine turning toward Western markets pissed him off.

Exactly NATO's 'facts'

[revelarts]

Tell Putin. He's the aggressor. A word from him and withdrawal of Russian forces from all occupied Ukrainian territory would end this whole thing.

That's one option.
But if Ukrainian lives are paramount, then a cease fire from either side would be a good place to start, correct?
or is a Russian withdrawal more important?

[Gunny]

That's one option.
But if Ukrainian lives are paramount, then a cease fire from either side would be a good place to start, correct?
or is a Russian withdrawal more important?

A coward dies a thousand deaths. A hero dies but once. At what price to you cling to your fragile ability to suck in your next breath?

[Black Diamond]

Exactly NATO's 'facts'

There it is. In plain writing. Thank you. Putin will never go for that. Ever.
14699

[Kathianne]

There it is. In plain writing. Thank you. Putin will never go for that. Ever.
14699

What would Russia expect? Too bad, if they wanted that promise, they would have respected the borders. Time for US to recognize that fact too.

[revelarts]

A coward dies a thousand deaths. A hero dies but once. At what price to you cling to your fragile ability to suck in your next breath?
so Russian withdrawal is more important/honorable than Ukrainian lives.
Just wanted to be clear.
And i guess Russian civilians are honorable targets for the heroes journey.

[Kathianne]

so Russian withdrawal is more important/honorable than Ukrainian lives.
Just wanted to be clear.
And i guess Russian civilians are honorable targets for the heroes journey.

I think I'd put it a touch differently, appeasement is usually a bad idea. In both geopolitics and with schoolyard bullies.

[revelarts]

A coward dies a thousand deaths. A hero dies but once. At what price to you cling to your fragile ability to suck in your next breath?

so Russian withdrawal is more important/honorable than Ukrainian lives.
Just wanted to be clear.
And i guess Russian civilians are honorable targets for the heroes journey.

I think I'd put it a touch differently, appeasement is usually a bad idea. In both geopolitics and with schoolyard bullies.



I think my version is pretty honest.
So i guess the only question is should Ukrainians fight to the last man, woman & child?
Or is there some point where it's not dishonorable to simply surrender?
If so what would that be?
Sometimes even nations in "the right" do lose, correct?

[Kathianne]

I think my version is pretty honest.
So i guess the only question is should Ukrainians fight to the last man, woman & child?
Or is there some point where it's not dishonorable to simply surrender?
If so what would that be?
Sometimes even nations in "the right" do lose, correct?

Russia could go back to their borders. Ukrainians could start rebuilding. Could have been done over a year ago, Russia chooses differently.

[Gunny]

There it is. In plain writing. Thank you. Putin will never go for that. Ever.
14699

That information is one-sided and incorrect.

NATO has steadfastly failed to reach consensus on even a MAP, which is the BS a country has to go through before it can even be considered for membership. It wasn't going to happen because of NATO, not Ukraine. If it happens now, it will be because of Putin. Putin's invasion of Ukraine has legitimized the need for NATO for anyone threatened by Russia's expansionist actions. NATO denied entertaining the notion for the very reason of not provoking Putin.

Again it comes back to Vlad the Inhaler as THE problem. Not Ukraine, NATO and/or the US or any other European country that was fat, dumb and happy buying Putin's gas and oil so they could keep their hands clean of all that global warming pollutant crap. Vlad the Inhaler's actions, not Ukraine's, NATOs nor the US's had done more to weaponize Europe than any other single move any country has made.

As far as anything Ukraine states about wanting to be its own country, I'm having trouble finding fault with that. What I DO find trouble with are people who sit around talking all this isolationist, America-first being against anyone else who believes the same thing because any resulting action might inconvenience or threaten their personal desires.

Yet these very same people can't understand the simple equation of: if Ukrainians are fighting and stopping Putin's expansionist plans then we don't have to and we don't have to put our troops on the ground. If Russia gets past Ukraine, putting troops on the ground in Eastern Europe is then fighting IN NATO countries and we don't a have a choice, by treaty, to do anything but respond. All this is costing us now is money. If Putin gets past Ukraine, it's going to cost us not only money but blood as well.

[Kathianne]

the Russian invasion makes Ukraine joining NATO near inevitable. More than that, it's caused other countries to want entry in DEFENSIVE organization. Russia did that.

[Black Diamond]

so Russian withdrawal is more important/honorable than Ukrainian lives.
Just wanted to be clear.
And i guess Russian civilians are honorable targets for the heroes journey.

Ukrainians don't want Russia in their country so getting them out is more important than their lives for the most part yes . But I think a deal can be cut that makes them leave . But it won't be done with Biden or Harris. There's a, chance trump would but it's not guaranteed.

[revelarts]

So i guess the only question is should Ukrainians fight to the last man, woman & child?

Or is there some point where it's not dishonorable to simply surrender?
If so what would that be?

Sometimes even nations in "the right" do lose, correct?

[fj1200]

So i guess the only question is should Ukrainians fight to the last man, woman & child?

Or is there some point where it's not dishonorable to simply surrender?
If so what would that be?

Sometimes even nations in "the right" do lose, correct?

The underlying premise of your rhetorical questions are; It's up to us to decide for them.

[Kathianne]

So i guess the only question is should Ukrainians fight to the last man, woman & child?

Or is there some point where it's not dishonorable to simply surrender?
If so what would that be?

Sometimes even nations in "the right" do lose, correct?

It would be good to see Russia capitulate.

[revelarts]

The underlying premise of your rhetorical questions are; It's up to us to decide for them.

no, its all opinion here.

People here (including me) seem very convinced about what the Ukrainians & Russians should & shouldn't do.
& the 1st 3 questions are not rhetorical.
But very practical.
Especially when it's deemed a cowardly living death not to fight for your land/freedom.


Should Ukrainians fight to the last man, woman & child?
-not rhetorical-


Or is there some point where it's not dishonorable to simply surrender?
If so what would that be?
-not rhetorical-


All are real world questions.

[fj1200]

no, its all opinion here.

People here (including me) seem very convinced about what the Ukrainians & Russians should & shouldn't do.
& the 1st 3 questions are not rhetorical.
But very practical.
Especially when it's deemed a cowardly living death not to fight for your land/freedom.


Should Ukrainians fight to the last man, woman & child?
-not rhetorical-


Or is there some point where it's not dishonorable to simply surrender?
If so what would that be?
-not rhetorical-


All are real world questions.




I'm not convinced at all about what they should do other than Russia shouldn't be there. But they are not for you/us to decide; rhetorical. The question for we/us is do we fund them?

[Gunny]

no, its all opinion here.

People here (including me) seem very convinced about what the Ukrainians & Russians should & shouldn't do.
& the 1st 3 questions are not rhetorical.
But very practical.
Especially when it's deemed a cowardly living death not to fight for your land/freedom.


Should Ukrainians fight to the last man, woman & child?
-not rhetorical-


Or is there some point where it's not dishonorable to simply surrender?
If so what would that be?
-not rhetorical-


All are real world questions.


Answer your own question, only put your version of the US Constitution into the question. When is it dishonorable not to surrender?

[revelarts]

Answer your own question, only put your version of the US Constitution into the question. When is it dishonorable not to surrender?

If I were Ukrainian in the feild and I'm looking at the lose of most future battles no matter what i do,
I know about the lack of eligible men in Ukraine left to fight,
and i'm looking at the imminent death of my wife, kids, nieces & aunts.

I'm not trusting the U.S. or NATO to send troops and bail us out or think that that would mean MORE Ukrainians would live to reclaim anything.
Just the opposite. Those left, if any, to Rebuild would be in perpetual allegiance & debt to western powers, or Russia.
And if NATO won, Russia would still be an enemy with a grudge looking over our shoulders.

Dying with honor sounds like it might be the best way out of a tragic situation.
Probably mildly similar to what the Japanese kamikazes thought.

practically I'd see a no one win situation here.
But I wouldn't let anyone's words... who's not there... shame me if I quit to keep what's left of my family alive.

[Gunny]

If I were Ukrainian in the feild and I'm looking at the lose of most future battles no matter what i do,
I know about the lack of eligible men in Ukraine left to fight,
and i'm looking at the imminent death of my wife, kids, nieces & aunts.

I'm not trusting the U.S. or NATO to send troops and bail us out or think that that would mean MORE Ukrainians would live to reclaim anything.
Just the opposite. Those left, if any, to Rebuild would be in perpetual allegiance & debt to western powers, or Russia.
And if NATO won, Russia would still be an enemy with a grudge looking over our shoulders.

Dying with honor sounds like it might be the best way out of a tragic situation.
Probably mildly similar to what the Japanese kamikazes thought.

practically I'd see a no one win situation here.
But I wouldn't let anyone's words... who's not there... shame me if I quit to keep what's left of my family alive.

It is impossible to win without risking losing.

[revelarts]

It is impossible to win without risking losing.
Do you think Ukraine is winning?
Or is poised to win?

[revelarts]

Another question.
Can someone remind me... historically... how well invading Russia has gone for other nations?

[Kathianne]

And how is it going now? Ukraine tried to hit Moscow, nyet. However, it seems Putin, who hasn't been seen lately, is suggesting that Kursk may have to adjust to Ukrainian presence.

You really might want to go see the refineries buring.

https://pjmedia.com/vodkapundit/2024/08/22/ukraine-big-day-of-airstrikes-n4931871


'They Completely Smashed It!' Ukraine's Big Day of Airstrikes Is a Hit in RussiaStephen Green | 12:30 PM on August 22, 2024



Alexei Druzhinin, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP
The month of the Kursk Surprise turns out to have all kinds of surprises, including Kyiv's longest-range drone strike against Russia — so far, anyway. A bit less far away in Volgograd (née Stalingrad), a huge oil depot has been blowing up all day. I have video of that and more for you below.


In this week's biggest underreported story of the war, Ukraine commander-in-chief Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi told President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that UA forces "managed to capture another Krasnooktyabrskoe settlement and in this way, they completely cut off the Russian army's land communication with the southern bank of the Seym River in the Glushkovsky district of the Kursk region."


Any Russian forces still there — and there are estimated to be hundreds of them — are effectively cut off. Ukraine is estimated to have captured around 2,000 Russian POWs during the Kursk Surprise. If Syrskyi's report is correct, they could net quite a few more.


Now back to those drone strikes.


Russia's Marinovka air base east of Ukraine near Volgograd (née Stalingrad) was hit hard by drones.




Top-of-the-line Su-34 fighter/bombers and older Su-24 light bombers are — were? — stationed at Marinovka. It's hard to imagine anything surviving those fires, but you never know.


Multiple strikes on an oil depot in nearby Rostov started fires burning with such incredible heat that they can't be put out.




An attempted airstrike on Moscow went less well. The Kremlin claims to have shot down all 11 drones and I'd believe them because there have been no reports of damage or casualties.


Even with the failure to hit Moscow, it all adds up to what might be Ukraine's largest and most destructive day of strikes on Russia yet.


Biden, for all of his tough talk, is AWOL. Foreign Policy reported Wednesday that "frustration is mounting on Capitol Hill" because "the Biden administration has failed to meet a deadline to provide Congress with a detailed written report of its strategy for the war in Ukraine."


"The strategy report was due to be submitted to Congress in early June as a requirement of the multibillion-dollar package of military aid for Ukraine and other U.S. allies," but Biden has yet to submit it 10 weeks later.


“This abdication of leadership, combined with numerous missed opportunities to capitalize on Russia’s battlefield mistakes, has needlessly cost lives and prolonged the war,” Senate Armed Services Committee ranking member Roger Wicker said in an emailed statement. “Ukraine is demonstrating every day that it can defeat Putin’s illegal invasion. It is time for the President to take the handcuffs off our aid.”


Finally, in one of those things that makes you go, "Hmmm," ISW reported Wednesday that "the Kremlin is actively trying to condition Russian society to accept the limited Ukrainian presence in Kursk Oblast as a 'new normal' and downplay the significance of the incursion."


For a military that was just until last month thought to be being bled nearly dry, it's been one helluva show these last two weeks.

[Black Diamond]

Another question.
Can someone remind me... historically... how well invading Russia has gone for other nations?

It's August. I, doubt they'll make it as far as napoleon and Hitler but who knows. Putin will use nukes before they get that far i think. This has me more nervous then before.

I also think if putin were overthrown he would be killed. He has hinted at this. But I've read it recently

[Kathianne]

It's August. I, doubt they'll make it as far as napoleon and Hitler but who knows. Putin will use nukes before they get that far i think. This has me more nervous then before.

I also think if putin were overthrown he would be killed. He has hinted at this. But I've read it recently

I don't think they are actually trying to 'gain Russian land,' there's nothing about Ukraine that has been aggressive, until 2 weeks ago, when Joe was failing, Trump ascending, Poland trying to shut everything up regarding the Nord Stream pipeline explosion. I still think for the most part it was a bargaining move, now? Not sure.

[Gunny]

I don't think they are actually trying to 'gain Russian land,' there's nothing about Ukraine that has been aggressive, until 2 weeks ago, when Joe was failing, Trump ascending, Poland trying to shut everything up regarding the Nord Stream pipeline explosion. I still think for the most part it was a bargaining move, now? Not sure.

Ukraine does not have the means to occupy Russia. From a military perspective, the most obvious ploy is to take stress off the line in the south. Russian land is a bargaining chip only if Ukraine can hold it. I don't think what Ukraine has taken so far is worth trying to hold in cost of manpower and materiel.

My first question is: When and if Russia stabilizes the new line in Kursk, what has Ukraine accomplished? It may very well pull Russian troops from the south which is short term. It also ties up Ukraine manning a line it created itself.

Who can most easily replace their troops?

[Kathianne]

Ukraine does not have the means to occupy Russia. From a military perspective, the most obvious ploy is to take stress off the line in the south. Russian land is a bargaining chip only if Ukraine can hold it. I don't think what Ukraine has taken so far is worth trying to hold in cost of manpower and materiel.

My first question is: When and if Russia stabilizes the new line in Kursk, what has Ukraine accomplished? It may very well pull Russian troops from the south which is short term. It also ties up Ukraine manning a line it created itself.

Who can most easily replace their troops?

I have no idea, I've never focused on military strategy or even major battles outside of American History and D-Day in WWII. I don't think Ukraine, much less Russia thought they'd do this or still be there. But they are and taking POWs every day.

[Black Diamond]

Ukraine does not have the means to occupy Russia. From a military perspective, the most obvious ploy is to take stress off the line in the south. Russian land is a bargaining chip only if Ukraine can hold it. I don't think what Ukraine has taken so far is worth trying to hold in cost of manpower and materiel.

My first question is: When and if Russia stabilizes the new line in Kursk, what has Ukraine accomplished? It may very well pull Russian troops from the south which is short term. It also ties up Ukraine manning a line it created itself.

Who can most easily replace their troops?

Yeah I think the goal is to get a buffer zone and blow up bridges in Russia. Which they have done.

[Gunny]

Yeah I think the goal is to get a buffer zone and blow up bridges in Russia. Which they have done.True. Russia is still making gains in the south even as it mismanages Kursk. What Ukraine does next will maybe give an idea of its strategy. What they have done tactically so is sound but tactics support strategy.

So Ukraine has taken a chunk of Russian land. Great PR. What are they going to do with it?

[Kathianne]

Hmmmm:

https://hotair.com/headlines/2024/09/02/ukraine-strikes-moscow-oil-refinery-in-massive-drone-barrage-n3793958

[Gunny]

Hmmmm:

https://hotair.com/headlines/2024/09/02/ukraine-strikes-moscow-oil-refinery-in-massive-drone-barrage-n3793958It looks more and more like they are after Russia's weak logistics capabilities. They also bombed a Russian airfield in Crimea. One of their primary targets is the Kursk Bridge that ties Russia to Crimea. Russia has had to put one of it's best weapons systems on the bridge. The bridge has been so degraded it can't handle a big load as it is. Since Russia uses mostly rail to supply its forces, it is going to have to somehow work that problem out or they won't be able to supply their troops in Eastern Ukraine. The Russian navy has been pulled all the way back to Russia proper and isn't exactly a reliable means of transport.

The question is can Ukraine sustain this?

[fj1200]

The question is can Ukraine sustain this?

Drones are cheap?

[Kathianne]

I'm pretty sure Ukraine did not ask anyone if ok to take it to Russia. It's working to some degree and should be used to try and draw the whole thing to a close. Everyone go home to original borders.

[Kathianne]

Gunny a bit more military critique in this article:

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ukraines-gamble?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=twofa&utm_campaign=Ukraine%E2%80%99s%20Gamble&utm_content=20240906&utm_term=EWZZZ003ZX


Ukraine’s GambleThe Risks and Rewards of the Offensive Into Russia’s Kursk Region
By Michael Kofman and Rob Lee
September 2, 2024


On August 6, Ukraine launched a bold offensive into Russia’s Kursk region, leveraging surprise and speed to quickly bypass Russian defensive lines. Since then, Ukraine has captured a significant tract of Russian territory and taken hundreds of Russian soldiers as prisoners. Now, three weeks into the attack, Ukrainian forces are holding territory and continuing offensive operations. They appear intent on consolidating a defensible buffer inside Russia.


This offensive has shifted the formerly gloomy narrative, at least for the moment, about the negative trajectory of the war. But Kyiv must decide what to make of its initial win. The offensive has yet to draw significant Russian forces from Ukraine’s eastern regions, and it remains unclear how Ukraine’s leaders intend to translate this tactical success into strategic or political gains. The offensive offers opportunities, but also carries considerable risks and costs. So far, Ukraine’s operations have been conducted by a mixed grouping of units, featuring perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers in total, with elements of regular brigades and Ukrainian special operations forces. These are some of Ukraine’s better and most experienced troops, with the backbone drawn from Ukraine’s elite Air Assault Forces. Some have been pulled off the frontlines in Donetsk and Kharkiv, where they were fighting against a Russian advance, whereas others would have served as an important reserve to stem Russian momentum.


By redirecting resources away from defensive efforts in the eastern Donetsk region, Ukraine is betting that other parts of the 750-mile front won’t collapse, that it will not lose a large number of soldiers and equipment in Kursk, and that the benefits from its operations in Kursk will outweigh the costs sustained elsewhere. Ukraine’s military leadership also hoped the incursion would divert Russian forces from its frontlines in the east; however, the commander in chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Oleksandr Syrsky, said that Russia has instead intensified its efforts and deployed its most combat-ready units to the Pokrovsk front in Donetsk. Politically, Ukraine is also likely gambling that it can hold Kursk long enough to use it as a bargaining chip in the event that Kyiv is pressured to conduct negotiations. This could work if there is a way to compel Moscow to negotiate on such preferred timelines. But the territory could further strain Ukraine’s military over the winter. Either way, Kyiv hopes the Kursk offensive will spur a change in the perception that the war is on a negative trajectory, unlocking additional material assistance and altering the West’s weapons restrictions.


Ukraine’s Kursk incursion has raised flagging morale among its troops and restored its initiative along a patch of the front. The attack has also deeply embarrassed Moscow, demonstrating how unprepared Russia was for an offensive operation along the border. Three months after launching its own incursion into Kharkiv, Russia’s leadership undoubtedly believed that the war was steadily going its way and that time was on its side. Kursk will force Moscow to consider that Ukraine retains options, and that the outcome of this war is still unsettled.


So far, Kyiv has signaled that it will hold Kursk as a buffer space inside Russia, which means Ukrainian forces are there to stay. How large a salient projecting into Russia Kursk will become, and how much frontage Ukraine intends to hold, is not yet clear. But this offensive’s objectives appear much more limited in scope than prior ones. Unlike when Ukraine fought to expel Russia from the Kharkiv region in 2022, the Kursk offensive has not encircled or destroyed substantial Russian forces, which would lead to captured equipment and ruined offensive capability. The prisoners Ukraine has taken are primarily border guards, conscripts, and Akhmat units—paramilitary Chechen units ostensibly under the Russian National Guard. Some Russian conscripts have already been exchanged with Moscow for Ukrainian prisoners of war.


The offensive does not redress the current materiel imbalance in the war. For now, Russia retains an advantage in manpower, equipment, and ammunition. This advantage has not proved decisive, or led to operationally significant breakthroughs, but Russian forces have steadily gained 750 square miles of territory since October 2023, and they have kept advancing in the weeks since Ukraine pushed into Kursk. Recently, the pace of that advance has accelerated, and Ukraine’s position looks increasingly precarious along parts of the front.


Kyiv has signaled that it will hold Kursk as a buffer space inside Russia.
Russian advances put at risk cities. That includes Pokrovsk, which is an important transit hub Ukraine is now forced to evacuate. As the pressure mounts, Ukrainian forces could end up ceding terrain gradually, then suddenly, in some places. But judging success by territory gained is misleading. More important is the balance of attrition. Holding a prepared defense is easier than offense and typically less costly. Before the Kursk operation, Ukraine was slowly bleeding Russian offensive power in exchange for territory gained. That kept the risk of a Russian breakthrough low, and it offered Ukraine the chance to rebuild its exhausted military over the coming months. An expanded strike campaign into Russia with drones and newly made missiles was slowly raising the costs of sustaining the war. This was not an especially daring or novel approach, but it was effective. After a new mobilization law went into effect in May, Ukraine more than doubled the number of volunteers and mobilized soldiers joining the military. Ukraine was steadily addressing its deficit of manpower and fortifications, increasing attrition to Russian forces on the battlefield, and supporting infrastructure behind the frontlines. In this context, the Kursk offensive freights Ukraine’s position with added risk.


The attacking force in Kursk was composed of pieces from many brigades, assault battalions, and specialized units. Unless rotated back, these troops will not be able to plug gaps, serve as reserves, or counter Russian advances inside Ukraine. The offensive, in other words, weakens Ukraine’s already shaky front. Following Russia’s Kharkiv offensive in May, Ukraine’s military has been stretched thin, with defensive lines buckling across Donetsk. Russian forces have also been pushing Ukrainian lines back along several axes running from Vuhledar to Pokrovsk, Toretsk to Chasiv Yar, and near Kupiansk.


This is not to say that the offensive was inherently ill conceived. The operation was well-executed and quickly achieved several limited, but important, objectives, which would have made it an effective one-week raid. If it could pull significant Russian forces from other fronts, then the payoff would be more than worth the risk. But thus far, there is little evidence of it doing so.


The timing and organization of the offensive suggests that Ukraine’s leaders judged they needed to act. One possible reason is the looming U.S. election, which threatens to push Kyiv into negotiations with Moscow while in a position of weakness. In theory, by seizing Russian territory, Ukraine can significantly improve its bargaining power. Ukraine’s leadership may therefore judge that they are now better positioned for whatever political reality they will face in January. But this is a matter of perspective. No negotiations were in the offing, and Kyiv certainly could have waited until it had a sense of the future of U.S. policy. Right now, there is no compelling reason for why Moscow must negotiate while Ukraine holds its territory, and no indication that it might be inclined to do so. If anything, Russia is likely to maintain offensive pressure along the frontline while building up forces to eventually counterattack at Kursk. A Russian attack could be more effective in the winter, once the dense foliage in tree lines used by Ukrainian forces for concealment dissipates.


AN UNEXPECTED OFFENSIVE
Although Russia had two defensive lines established in Kursk, they were lightly manned by border guards and conscripts, backed by an Akhmat unit. Effectively combining armor, mechanized infantry, and artillery, Ukrainian forces quickly bypassed or encircled the Russian defenders. Ill equipped and unprepared to counter such a force, many surrendered. The Ukrainian military demonstrated that it had learned from past offensives, bringing mine-clearing vehicles, air defense, and electronic warfare systems to support the initial assault. Ukraine also seems to have achieved success countering Russian reconnaissance drones with first-person-view drones at the beginning, limiting Russia’s ability to quickly respond. Even though Russian drones detected and observed the offensive, Ukraine achieved operational surprise. Planning appears to have been closely held, even within Ukraine’s own government circles. Kyiv did not inform international partners, who might have discouraged it or leaked the plans. During past operations, such as Ukraine’s 2023 summer offensive or its second raid into Russia’s Belgorod region in the spring of 2024, Russian forces appeared well positioned in advance with detailed knowledge of Ukrainian planning. In this case, there were no Russian units pre-positioned to respond and no operational reserve that could quickly answer.


In an ode to the 2022 Kharkiv offensive, which was also planned by the Ukrainian commander in chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukrainian units leveraged speed, sowing confusion as they flew down roads through multiple towns. Early Russian efforts to send reinforcements were countered with High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) strikes, destroying columns of Russian troops that were careless in their positioning. The initial Russian response has been shambolic, typical of the military leadership’s inability to respond to dynamic situations. Command-and-control arrangements are also confusing in this part of Russia, where responsibilities between the Moscow military district, forces belonging to the Leningrad military district, the Federal Security Service, and other organizations overlap. Unlike in Ukraine, where the battlefield is divided among regional groupings, it has taken Russia some time to sort out who oversees the overall, national response versus who is commanding the military effort.


Russia has been sending reinforcements to the region. They feature an incohesive grouping of conscripts from deeper within the country and regular units redeployed from less important fronts inside Ukraine. The Russian military used battalions piecemeal from their brigades, including naval infantry and airborne forces, and deployed special operations and irregular units. Thus far, Russia has pulled from Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv while maintaining offensive operations around the eastern cities of Vuhledar, Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and Kupiansk. It also appears that Russia is prioritizing the redeployment of unmanned aerial vehicle strike units that can move faster and have less of an effect on Russian offensive operations than infantry reserves. At the same, Russia has quickly constructed fortifications deeper in Kursk. Russia’s response to Kursk, thus far, appears to be an economy of force effort to contain the incursion, as it continues to prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk. Moscow may be showing a degree of caution, aware that, in past years, Ukraine has typically launched attacks on multiple axes. It is possible that this is not Ukraine’s only planned offensive operation.


Russia’s air force has shifted air support from other fronts, particularly from Kharkiv, to counter the Kursk incursion, but the overall Russian offensive effort has not slowed. Most recently, Russian units have captured most of Niu-York, advanced into Toretsk, and come within artillery range of Pokrovsk. As a key transit hub, Pokrovsk important for sustaining defense in Donetsk and blocking further Russian advances. Even if Russia cannot quickly capture the city, placing Pokrvosk within artillery range has forced civilians to flee and will prevent its use as a rail hub for the area. The Russian advance there also threatens Ukraine’s flanks and could force a larger retreat down from Kurakhove and Vuhledar. The Kursk offensive has left Ukraine short on reserves to respond to any Russian breakthrough and, in some cases, rationing artillery ammunition.


UNCERTAIN TERMS
Although Ukraine’s initial losses in Kursk have been light, they are mounting as Russian forces become more organized and deploy reinforcements. Ukrainian forces are digging in, and Kyiv has signaled its intent to setup a military administration in the region. If Ukraine intends to hold the Kursk pocket for the foreseeable future—and all indicators suggest that it does—there is a strong likelihood the region will become the site of another grinding battle.


Much depends on how Moscow responds. If Russian forces throw themselves at Ukrainian lines, then Kyiv may force Moscow into a battle on its terms, lifting pressure across the front. This would be akin to how Russia responded to Ukraine’s capture of the village of Krynky across the Dnieper River in Kherson in 2023. Russia prioritized retaking the village, despite its minimal strategic importance, and sustained heavy losses among elite units as a result. Kursk could similarly sap Russian offensive strength, shifting the fight to Russian territory. Moscow may also feel compelled to create a sizable operational reserve and deploy larger garrisons along its borders. This, too, would reduce the combat power Russia has available to fight inside Ukraine. But if Russia contains the offensive and focuses on weakening Ukrainian forces with aviation, drones, and only a minimal commitment of troops, then this gambit may not pay off for Kyiv.


Ukraine’s strategy does not yet appear fully formed. The country’s military is working out logistics, communications issues, and other necessities for sustaining this salient. It will have to establish a defensible set of positions and a broader but shallower buffer inside Russia. Its advances in Kursk are likely designed to secure these objectives; the strikes on bridges, for example, are supposed to further isolate Russian forces along the border. Kyiv will have to choose whether to hold what it has or to invest more scarce resources into the operation in an effort to force a much larger Russian effort to counter it. But the risks should not be understated. The best-case scenario is that Ukrainian forces will hold Russia to relatively minor gains in Donetsk and retain Kursk with a sustainable force commitment. The offensive could also lead to changes in Western policy on the use of long-range strike weapons and infuse much needed energy into the West’s thinking on the way forward at this point in the war. The worst-case scenario is that, months from now, Ukraine will have lost significant tracts of land in its east and retained no territory in Kursk that it can use as a bargaining chip. The deeper Ukraine advances into Russia, the greater the risk of overextension.


COSTS AND BENEFITS
Ukraine had alternative options at this stage of the war. It could have focused on defense and reconstituted its understrength forces while expanding long-range strikes against Russia. Ukraine’s newly developed capabilities increasingly put Russian military and economic infrastructure at risk. Ukraine’s new volunteer and conscripted soldiers could have been sent to refill brigades holding the frontlines. They would have been used to build new formations. If Ukraine had focused on defense, it would have had a good chance of exhausting the Russian offensive while fixing manpower issues and stabilizing the frontlines by winter. At that point, Kyiv could have assessed its options.


Ukraine still would have lost territory in Donetsk, but it would have halted the Russian offensive and possibly held some of the cities currently at risk. Russia had reached the peak of its materiel advantage, so the risk of a major Russian breakthrough was decreasing, and Moscow could have been held to incremental gains. Ukraine could then have launched an offensive like the one in Kursk in 2025 under much more favorable circumstances. Russian limitations in equipment and manpower would have become more glaring, and Ukraine would have the benefit of newly formed brigades by that point, reducing the overall risk in force allocation.


None of these options were risk-free or cost-free. Military strategy is about choices. The Kursk offensive is creative, and it avoids a symmetric fight against a numerically superior opponent. Yet the longer the battle goes on and becomes positional in character, the more likely those advantages will dissipate. A fair amount of the future also depends on what happens not just at Kursk, but also in the battles for Ukraine’s cities in Donetsk. Kyiv may be resigned to losing cities such as Pokrovsk, assuming the consequences will not prove dramatic. But that, too, is a gamble. Both on the ground and in public perceptions, the pendulum can swing rather quickly if the news from the front is a steady drumbeat of lost cities and towns.


Ukraine has not been immune to sunk-cost thinking.
When under pressure, a fair bit can go wrong in coordinating defensive operations, especially among depleted units, and commanders may struggle to get an accurate understanding of the situation. Recurring problems with unit rotations, adjacent unit coordination, unclear command relationships, and employment of attached units by brigades exacerbate Ukraine’s relative inferiority in manpower and ammunition. Some of these issues are made worse by the Ukrainian military’s structure around brigades. As a result, tactical mistakes can become even more costly and lead to greater Russian advances. Many of the elite brigades deployed to Kursk would be less likely to commit these mistakes.


In the past, Ukraine has reinforced success, but its leadership has not been immune to the sort of sunk-cost thinking that leads states to feed resources into battles in which the costs outweigh the benefits, particularly once the military factors change. Early in 2023, Ukraine spent too many of its more experienced troops in a costly and geographically unfavorable battle over the city of Bakhmut, which was ultimately lost. Later that summer, Ukraine committed its reserves to a failed offensive, even though its day-one objectives had not been reached. It kept trying to advance as late as November, long after it ran out of assault-capable infantry and ammunition. And when Ukraine launched a cross-river operation in Krynky, its marines spent eight months holding a narrow lodgment, a small defensible position on the other side of the river. Russian forces wasted many of their airborne units trying to counterattack the position, but Ukraine’s marines paid a high price to sustain the operation, which had no hope of developing into anything other than an attritional battle. Although Ukraine might see Krynky as a model to improve on, the salient in Kursk is much larger and will require far more manpower to maintain.


As with the battle of Bakhmut and the 2023 summer offensive, it may take some time before observers can properly assess the Kursk operation. Furthermore, open-source intelligence is more likely to provide a distorted picture during rapid offensives that involve a more fluid frontline than they are during the routinized fighting taking place across the front. Maps that rely purely on open-source information and geolocations are, in particular, less likely to accurately reflect day-to-day changes in the frontline because much of the footage is not released publicly each day. This can give a distorted view of the rate of advances. Ukraine has a greater incentive than Russia does to withhold footage from Kursk, and it may want to publish misleading information to fool Russia. For outside observers, this makes it more difficult to assess the casualty ratio and relative equipment losses between Russia and Ukraine. The habit of both sides to deploy individual companies or battalions from brigades in a piecemeal fashion may also give false impressions about the size of the forces committed. Observers need to be cognizant that their view of the operation will almost certainly be flawed, and they need to be careful in drawing lessons about what happened and why.


WHITHER A STRATEGY?
Determining what this operation says about Ukraine’s overall strategy and the implications it has for the broader war effort is essential. In some ways, the offensive raises more questions than answers. Kyiv has long sought to end the war on favorable terms or, at the very least, avoid an unfavorable settlement that includes compromising Ukraine’s sovereignty or conceding territorial losses. In 2023, Kyiv hoped to gain the necessary leverage by breaking through Russian lines in the south and threatening Crimea. Seizing a part of Kursk may be an alternative means to achieve a similar end, assuming Ukraine can hold the territory for long enough.


For much of 2024, the West has been supporting a Ukrainian strike campaign in Crimea without a good explanation for what was meant to follow. It was serviceable as an end unto itself, degrading Russian air defense and support infrastructure. But that campaign now seems disconnected from Ukraine’s efforts in Kursk and its broader drone strike campaign against economic infrastructure in Russia. A series of disparate efforts do not a strategy make. If it was not clear before Kursk, the offensive puts into sharp relief the apparent lack of an agreed strategy between Ukraine and its Western partners. It therefore presents both challenges and opportunities. This turn of events should lead to a revision of the current strategy in this war, assuming one exists.


Since 2023, Washington has been out of ideas for how to successfully end the war on terms favorable to Ukraine. Kyiv, meanwhile, has been focused on stabilizing the frontline, but equally worried about the prevailing gloomy narrative and the sense that Ukraine is losing the war. The Kursk operation helps address the latter at the risk of doing damage to the former. Whether or not Kursk succeeds, at least it is not an attempt to refight the failed 2023 offensive, a set-piece battle in which Ukraine held no decisive advantages. That said, Kyiv’s present theory of success remains unclear.


Beyond the Kursk offensive and the situation at the front, Russia’s strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy grid is increasingly the bigger problem. Ukraine faces an uncertain winter. It needs generators and air defense to close gaps in its coverage. More important, Ukraine needs a way to compel Russia to stop these strikes, if not in 2024, then certainly in 2025. In this light, Ukraine’s desire to lift the remaining restrictions on the use of Western long-range strike systems is understandable. The Kursk offensive has prompted that conversation, but it needs to do much more. Holding Kursk as a bargaining chip, expanding strikes, and putting economic pressure on Russia could significantly strengthen Ukraine’s hand, assuming Ukraine can also hold the line, exhaust Russia’s offensive potential, and withstand Russia’s strike campaign this winter. However it ends, the Kursk offensive needs to provide the impetus for Ukraine and its partners to get on the same page—and shake off the current drift.