Navy Avoiding Shock Testing USS Ford

[Kathianne]

Repercussions could follow the next round of ships?

https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2019/10/23/the-navy-obfuscates-on-shock-testing-the-13-billion-dollar-uss-ford/#58e7d41967bf

[STTAB]

Another symptom of a much larger problem of these bureaucracies (and yes that is what the Navy is) doing whatever the hell they want rather than following orders.

It's along the lines of what Trump has been dealing with, these people in government dont want what Trump wants, so the fact that they work for him means nothing. They just avoid and ignore him , waiting him out rather than following his orders as their jobs dictate they do.

Something drastic needs to be done to force these government employees to start following the law. In this particular case people need to start losing their commands until the Navy complies with the law.

That's no comment on whether shock testing is necessary or whatever, that's just a fact. Once Congress passes a law, that is no longer the Navy's call.

[Elessar]

As a Naval combatant platform, they have to be "shock tested".

What's with these people? Is it just ignorance, or simple defiance of sense?

Amazes me.

[icansayit]

Usual practice when I was still in, back in 1995 was...the navy assigns one class of ship (new design), or a ship which has been overhauled, and refitted with new engineering gear.

The massive expense of Shock Tests is a no brainer. It is usually conducted by Civilian engineering firms, that require almost a full year of preparation of the ship to be tested, with measuring equipment that must be removed, following the Shock Testing.
And, when the testing is completed. More expense is needed for the Unfitting of the ship.
Since the Ford is such a very large platform (biggest of the Class, as First). The manpower to perform the testing, after the installation of the thousands of TESTING gear placed throughout the ship...is probably COST INEFFECTIVE since the Ford already has gone WAY OVER budget.

Ask any Maritime Engineer for electronics, weapons, navigation, habitability, and health....Told you all. I've got many years under my belt. If you want to disagree, or claim I'm blowing Smoke. FINE. Have it your way. I'm too old to make this stuff up.:laugh:

[Kathianne]

Usual practice when I was still in, back in 1995 was...the navy assigns one class of ship (new design), or a ship which has been overhauled, and refitted with new engineering gear.

The massive expense of Shock Tests is a no brainer. It is usually conducted by Civilian engineering firms, that require almost a full year of preparation of the ship to be tested, with measuring equipment that must be removed, following the Shock Testing.
And, when the testing is completed. More expense is needed for the Unfitting of the ship.
Since the Ford is such a very large platform (biggest of the Class, as First). The manpower to perform the testing, after the installation of the thousands of TESTING gear placed throughout the ship...is probably COST INEFFECTIVE since the Ford already has gone WAY OVER budget.

Ask any Maritime Engineer for electronics, weapons, navigation, habitability, and health....Told you all. I've got many years under my belt. If you want to disagree, or claim I'm blowing Smoke. FINE. Have it your way. I'm too old to make this stuff up.:laugh:
Not disagreeing with your rationale. Seems penny wise, but dollar foolish though in application. If there’s a design flaw, subsequent ships will follow with the same.

[STTAB]

Usual practice when I was still in, back in 1995 was...the navy assigns one class of ship (new design), or a ship which has been overhauled, and refitted with new engineering gear.

The massive expense of Shock Tests is a no brainer. It is usually conducted by Civilian engineering firms, that require almost a full year of preparation of the ship to be tested, with measuring equipment that must be removed, following the Shock Testing.
And, when the testing is completed. More expense is needed for the Unfitting of the ship.
Since the Ford is such a very large platform (biggest of the Class, as First). The manpower to perform the testing, after the installation of the thousands of TESTING gear placed throughout the ship...is probably COST INEFFECTIVE since the Ford already has gone WAY OVER budget.

Ask any Maritime Engineer for electronics, weapons, navigation, habitability, and health....Told you all. I've got many years under my belt. If you want to disagree, or claim I'm blowing Smoke. FINE. Have it your way. I'm too old to make this stuff up.:laugh:


None of that matters though if Congress passes a law.

I myself believe that shock testing is an antiquated method given computer simulation technology. You can't tell me we can't simulate on a computer exactly how that carrier will react to a near miss, or even a direct hit. BUT that is again irrelevant. If Congress passes a law, the Navy damn sure needs to follow the law.

[Kathianne]

https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htnavai/articles/20190216.aspx


Naval Air: EMALS In The Age Of Error

February 16, 2019: In early 2019 the U.S. Navy confirmed that it had major problems with the design, construction and performance of its new EMALS (Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System) catapult installed in its latest aircraft carrier; the USS Ford (CVN 78) and the three other Ford class carriers under construction. During 2017 sea trials the Ford used EMALS heavily, as would be the case in combat and training operations. EMALS proved less reliable than the older steam catapult, more labor intensive to operate, put more stress on launched aircraft than expected and due to a basic design flaw if one EMALS catapult becomes inoperable, the other three catapults could not be used in the meantime as was the case with steam catapults. This meant that the older practice of taking one or more steam catapults off line for maintenance or repairs while at sea was not practical because the design of the EMALS system did not allow for it. The navy admitted that for EMALS the plan was that in combat if one or more catapults were rendered unusable they remained that way until it was possible to shut down all four catapults for repairs.


There may be other problems with the Ford as the navy also asked for another delay in performing mandated shock tests, in which controlled explosions were set off near the hull that generated at least 66 percent of amount of force the ship was designed to handle. This would reveal what equipment was not sufficiently built or installed to handle shock and make changes as well as confirming that the hull can handle the stress overall. The navy wants to wait until the second Ford class carrier enters service in 2024 because, it admits, it is unsure how badly shock tests would damage new systems and design features. Meanwhile there are some other major shortcomings with the Fords, including electronics (the radars), the flight deck arresting gear and some of the elevators. But none of these are as serious as the malfunctioning catapults and a several less serious new equipment problems (ammo elevators, radar systems, ship wide new software debugging). For the first half of 2019 the Ford will be worked on to fix all the problems still needing attention. By the end of 2019 the Ford is expected to be as ready, if not more so, for action than existing Nimitz class CVNs.


All this drama is, for those familiar with the introduction of new military technology, mainly about media dramatization of normal development effort. That means sometimes the ship design turns out to be a failure or unsuitable. Cost is often a factor. The problems could be fixed but the cost of each ship (or aircraft or vehicle) might then become unaffordable. Thus we have three Seawolf SSNs instead of dozens and three Zumwalt class destroyers instead of dozens for the same reason. The LCS (Littoral Combat Ship) was not a success (but not a complete failure) and dozens are being built while a new, more conventional, design for this frigate size ship is being sought. These expensive failures were not a total loss as much of the new teach and design concepts did work and were used in subsequent, more affordable, designs.


The problem with CVNs is that you don’t develop a new design very frequently. The Ford is the first new CVN design in 40 years. And only ten, at most, are being built. Thus the technical problems with the Ford class are a big deal. The navy believes that, based on past experience the problems with EMALS were of the sort that could be fixed while the new ship was in service. That included tweaking EMALS operation to generate less stress on aircraft and modifying design of EMALS and reorganizing how sailors use the system to attain the smaller number of personnel required for catapult operations. But the fatal flaws involved reliability and after another year of effort the navy insists progress has been made and EMALS is becoming a mature technology. The goal for “mature EMALS” was set before the Ford was launched. An EMALS catapult was supposed to have a breakdown every 4,100 launches but in heavy use during sea trials EMALS actually failed every 400 launches. By the end of 2017 the navy concluded that an EMALS equipped carrier had only a seven percent chance of successfully completing a typical four day “surge” (multiple catapult launches for a major combat operation) and only a 70 percent chance of completing a one day surge operation. That was because when one EMALS catapult went down all four were inoperable. In effect the Ford class carriers are much less capable of performing in combat than their predecessors. As of 2019 the navy says EMALS is more reliable but is not saying exactly how much more reliable. Not year at least.


With steam catapults when one went down the other three could continue to operate. Worse even minor repairs or maintenance on one catapult means all four had to be out of service. The navy has been working on modifications to EMALS to fix all these problems. In the meantime the new Ford carrier is much less useful than older ones that use steam catapults. In fact the Ford class carriers are basically worthless, except for training of the non-flight crew (which cannot function without reliable catapults). That is supposed to be combat ready by mid-2019. A number of senior navy personnel (uniformed and civilian) have said the problems will be fixed by then or they will step aside and resign/retire to let someone else try. A sign of confidence is the navy getting permission to buy two new Ford class carriers at once, which will cut costs by about 15 percent.

...

[STTAB]

https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htnavai/articles/20190216.aspx


Hilaarious given that months ago when Trump toured the Ford many of the crew complained to him that they much preferred the steam driven catapults of the older ships and when Trump was heard to remark that maybe we should return to that system the liberal trope was "haha Trump wants us to go back to steam powered carriers"

I despise liberal stupidity.