Kathianne
03-30-2015, 10:19 PM
The French historically have been the best at diplomacy of the West. This article is evidence of some of the reasons:
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/30/how-france-became-an-iran-hawk/
ARGUMENT (http://foreignpolicy.com/category/argument/)How France Became an Iran Hawk (http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/30/how-france-became-an-iran-hawk/)
The French don't trust Iran's nuclear promises, but they don't trust Washington much, either.
While the White House has been pushing hard for consensus on the framework for a deal ahead of the deadline, Paris has been pushing back. “Repeating that an agreement has to be reached by the end of March is a bad tactic. Pressure on ourselves to conclude at any price,” Gérard Araud, France’s ambassador in Washington, tweeted (https://twitter.com/GerardAraud/status/578977951259226112) on March 20. On Tuesday, François Delattre, France’s ambassador to the United Nations, said (http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2015/03/25/01003-20150325ARTFIG00431-tensions-franco-americaines-sur-le-nucleaire-iranien.php) that Iran’s progress was “insufficient.”
The word from Paris has been equally unsupportive of the U.S. push for a deal. “France wants an agreement, but a robust one that really guarantees that Iran can have access to civilian nuclear power, but not the atomic bomb,” French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius declared (http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/21/uk-iran-nuclear-france-idUKKBN0MH08J20150321) on March 21.
...
This exclusion has been coupled with increasing pressure from Washington. French diplomats complain (albeit only privately) that their American counterparts are trying to force them to make concessions on issues like the number of centrifuges allowed or sanctions in order to reach an agreement by March 31, a deadline that the French, like many of the White House’s critics back home, see as artificial and counterproductive.
The French do not share the sense of hurry that Washington seems to feel. As France’s ambassador to the United States tweeted (https://twitter.com/GerardAraud/status/572766123894153217) on March 3: “We want a deal. They need a deal. The tactics and the result of the negotiation should reflect this asymmetry.”
But the differences between the French and American positions go beyond process and into matters of substance. The lifting of sanctions, the scope of inspections, research and development capacities, the number of centrifuges Iran will be allowed to maintain, and how long the agreement will last are all areas in which Paris and Washington differ. In Lausanne last week, France rejected Iran’s demand to immediately lift United Nations Security Council sanctions linked to proliferation after an agreement, arguing that this can only come progressively, with verifications.
A central concern is “breakout time” (the minimum time needed to make weapons-grade uranium). According to current reports, a deal would ensure that Iranian breakout time would be moved back to one year. French negotiators want to ensure that Iran’s agreed-upon breakout time will last the entire duration of the deal — and after. They also want a deal that lasts as long as possible. “Ten years is short when you talk about nuclear issues,” one diplomat said.
Another diplomat summed it up: “We spent more than 10 years talking, slowly setting an architecture of sanctions, of pressure, defining principles of negotiations. Once we dismantle this, it won’t come back up. So we better get the best possible deal.”
...
These diplomats generally share the conviction that Tehran’s enrichment program is aimed at obtaining a nuclear weapon and that a bad deal that allows the Iranians to keep enriching uranium at dangerous levels will lead to a disastrous game of regional proliferation. Araud, Audibert, and their colleagues know the situation well: They have been engaged in 12 years of talks on these issues and at this point they feel they have little reason to trust the Iranians, or to believe that regional arrangements with Iran would decrease Tehran’s desire to acquire nuclear capabilities.
But policymakers in Paris might not trust the Americans much, either — and not just when it comes to the nuclear negotiations. French officials no longer hide their dismay at many of Washington’s policies in the Middle East.
...
Relations between Paris and Washington have been tainted with suspicion ever since Syria used chemical weapons in August 2013 and Obama failed to enforce his “red line.” The sudden American about-face was perceived by Hollande as a sign that Obama was dumping his allies. European countries, and France in particular, were ready to attack Syria in September 2013, after two weeks of stepping up pressure and building up their military presence in the Mediterranean.
Paris is in good company, alongside many of Washington’s traditional allies in the region, including the Gulf states, Israel, and Turkey, which have all felt shunted aside in the interest of reconciliation with Iran. Within the nuclear talks, France, which has strong ties with Gulf countries, has voiced these concerns.
Behind the Iran nuclear talks hovers the question of the future and shape of American power and leadership. For a decade, European countries have worked on trying to rein in Iran’s nuclear program. France, like the other countries, has taken an economic hit in this effort, thanks to the sanctions regime. Now the view from Paris is of a Washington that seems to lack empathy and trust for its longtime friends and partners — more interested in making nice with Iran than looking out for its old allies.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/30/how-france-became-an-iran-hawk/
ARGUMENT (http://foreignpolicy.com/category/argument/)How France Became an Iran Hawk (http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/30/how-france-became-an-iran-hawk/)
The French don't trust Iran's nuclear promises, but they don't trust Washington much, either.
While the White House has been pushing hard for consensus on the framework for a deal ahead of the deadline, Paris has been pushing back. “Repeating that an agreement has to be reached by the end of March is a bad tactic. Pressure on ourselves to conclude at any price,” Gérard Araud, France’s ambassador in Washington, tweeted (https://twitter.com/GerardAraud/status/578977951259226112) on March 20. On Tuesday, François Delattre, France’s ambassador to the United Nations, said (http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2015/03/25/01003-20150325ARTFIG00431-tensions-franco-americaines-sur-le-nucleaire-iranien.php) that Iran’s progress was “insufficient.”
The word from Paris has been equally unsupportive of the U.S. push for a deal. “France wants an agreement, but a robust one that really guarantees that Iran can have access to civilian nuclear power, but not the atomic bomb,” French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius declared (http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/21/uk-iran-nuclear-france-idUKKBN0MH08J20150321) on March 21.
...
This exclusion has been coupled with increasing pressure from Washington. French diplomats complain (albeit only privately) that their American counterparts are trying to force them to make concessions on issues like the number of centrifuges allowed or sanctions in order to reach an agreement by March 31, a deadline that the French, like many of the White House’s critics back home, see as artificial and counterproductive.
The French do not share the sense of hurry that Washington seems to feel. As France’s ambassador to the United States tweeted (https://twitter.com/GerardAraud/status/572766123894153217) on March 3: “We want a deal. They need a deal. The tactics and the result of the negotiation should reflect this asymmetry.”
But the differences between the French and American positions go beyond process and into matters of substance. The lifting of sanctions, the scope of inspections, research and development capacities, the number of centrifuges Iran will be allowed to maintain, and how long the agreement will last are all areas in which Paris and Washington differ. In Lausanne last week, France rejected Iran’s demand to immediately lift United Nations Security Council sanctions linked to proliferation after an agreement, arguing that this can only come progressively, with verifications.
A central concern is “breakout time” (the minimum time needed to make weapons-grade uranium). According to current reports, a deal would ensure that Iranian breakout time would be moved back to one year. French negotiators want to ensure that Iran’s agreed-upon breakout time will last the entire duration of the deal — and after. They also want a deal that lasts as long as possible. “Ten years is short when you talk about nuclear issues,” one diplomat said.
Another diplomat summed it up: “We spent more than 10 years talking, slowly setting an architecture of sanctions, of pressure, defining principles of negotiations. Once we dismantle this, it won’t come back up. So we better get the best possible deal.”
...
These diplomats generally share the conviction that Tehran’s enrichment program is aimed at obtaining a nuclear weapon and that a bad deal that allows the Iranians to keep enriching uranium at dangerous levels will lead to a disastrous game of regional proliferation. Araud, Audibert, and their colleagues know the situation well: They have been engaged in 12 years of talks on these issues and at this point they feel they have little reason to trust the Iranians, or to believe that regional arrangements with Iran would decrease Tehran’s desire to acquire nuclear capabilities.
But policymakers in Paris might not trust the Americans much, either — and not just when it comes to the nuclear negotiations. French officials no longer hide their dismay at many of Washington’s policies in the Middle East.
...
Relations between Paris and Washington have been tainted with suspicion ever since Syria used chemical weapons in August 2013 and Obama failed to enforce his “red line.” The sudden American about-face was perceived by Hollande as a sign that Obama was dumping his allies. European countries, and France in particular, were ready to attack Syria in September 2013, after two weeks of stepping up pressure and building up their military presence in the Mediterranean.
Paris is in good company, alongside many of Washington’s traditional allies in the region, including the Gulf states, Israel, and Turkey, which have all felt shunted aside in the interest of reconciliation with Iran. Within the nuclear talks, France, which has strong ties with Gulf countries, has voiced these concerns.
Behind the Iran nuclear talks hovers the question of the future and shape of American power and leadership. For a decade, European countries have worked on trying to rein in Iran’s nuclear program. France, like the other countries, has taken an economic hit in this effort, thanks to the sanctions regime. Now the view from Paris is of a Washington that seems to lack empathy and trust for its longtime friends and partners — more interested in making nice with Iran than looking out for its old allies.